FTT Refuses Late SDLT Appeal Where Appellants Chose Not to Seek Professional Advice: Goonesena and the Martland Framework

R & E Goonesena v HMRC [2024] UKFTT 619 (TC), released 25 June 2024 (case number TC09240, Tribunal Judge Abigail McGregor presiding), is the on-point recent FTT decision on the late-SDLT-appeal jurisdiction. The decision is published at caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/tc/2024/619. The Tribunal refused the appellants' application to bring a late appeal, holding that their reason for the 164-day delay (a conscious decision not to seek professional advice and not to appeal, based on their own uninformed belief that the case would fail) was not a good reason. This page sets out the statutory architecture of the SDLT appeal time-limit, the Martland v HMRC framework that the FTT applied, the substance of the Goonesena reasoning, the overpayment relief alternative for taxpayers outside the 30-day window, and the practical implications for taxpayers approached by SDLT-refund-claim firms many months or years after completion.

The 30-day statutory window under FA 2003 Schedule 10 paragraph 35

The SDLT appeal architecture is set out in Part 7 of FA 2003 Schedule 10. The statutory time-limit for lodging an appeal is 30 days from the date of HMRC's decision under FA 2003 Schedule 10 paragraph 35. The decisions that carry the 30-day window include:

• Closure notices under FA 2003 Schedule 10 paragraph 28, issued at the end of an HMRC enquiry into the SDLT return;
• Assessments under FA 2003 Schedule 10 paragraph 29, including discovery assessments where HMRC has reached outside the standard enquiry window;
• Determinations under FA 2003 Schedule 10 paragraph 25, where HMRC has issued a determination of SDLT due in the absence of a return.

Verbatim Schedule 10 text at legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/14/schedule/10 (verified 2026-05-26).

The 30-day window runs from the date of the decision notice. The taxpayer is expected to lodge a notice of appeal with HMRC, and (if no settlement is reached) with the First-tier Tribunal, within those 30 days. Where HMRC offers a review or the taxpayer requests one under FA 2003 Schedule 10A, the time-limits operate slightly differently and the tribunal appeal can be deferred to the post-review outcome, but the underlying 30-day discipline is the same.

The late-appeal jurisdiction: Tribunal Procedure Rules + Martland

Where a taxpayer has missed the 30-day window, the route to bring an appeal is by application to the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) under the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (SI 2009/273). Rule 5(3)(a) gives the Tribunal a discretionary case-management power to extend time. Rule 20(4) sets out the late-appeal procedure: the appellant lodges a notice of appeal together with reasons for the delay; HMRC respond; the Tribunal decides whether to admit the appeal.

The discretion under rule 5(3)(a) is exercised under the controlling Upper Tribunal authority of Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC). Martland establishes a three-stage framework that the FTT applies to every late-appeal application:

1. Stage one: length of the delay. A working benchmark of more than three months indicates serious or significant delay. Shorter delays may still be material; longer delays place a heavier burden on the appellant.
2. Stage two: reason(s) for the delay. The applicant must put forward a reason or reasons for the delay; the burden is on the applicant; the Tribunal evaluates each reason for weight and credibility.
3. Stage three: all the circumstances of the case. The Tribunal conducts a balancing exercise that includes the importance of compliance with statutory time-limits (presumption in favour of compliance), the merits of the substantive case (only where they can be assessed quickly and from the materials available), the prejudice to each party, the conduct of the appellant during and after the delay period, and any other relevant factors.

The Martland framework imports the Denton v TH White [2014] EWCA Civ 906 civil-procedure approach into the tax-tribunal context, modified for the tax-tribunal statutory time-limit regime. The Supreme Court in BPP Holdings v HMRC [2017] UKSC 55 confirmed that compliance with tax-tribunal time-limits is to be taken seriously and that a culture of compliance, rather than a culture of indulgence, is the right starting point. HMRC v Katib [2019] UKUT 189 (TCC) addresses the agent-failure side of the late-appeal jurisdiction: the taxpayer cannot generally rely on the failure of an engaged agent to lodge an appeal in time as a good reason for delay; the appeal-lodging obligation is personal.

The Goonesena facts and the Tribunal's reasoning

The Goonesena appellants had received an HMRC SDLT decision. The 30-day appeal window expired. They did not lodge an appeal within the window. 164 days after the deadline, they applied to the First-tier Tribunal for permission to bring a late appeal.

Their reason for delay was that they had made a conscious decision, at the time of the original 30-day window, not to seek professional advice and not to appeal. The decision was based on their own (uninformed) belief that their case would fail. Some time later they re-evaluated the position and concluded that an appeal might in fact have merit. They then sought to bring the appeal out of time.

The Tribunal applied the Martland framework. At stage one, the 164-day delay was serious and significant on the working benchmark of more than three months. At stage two, the reason for delay was the appellants' conscious choice; the Tribunal noted at paragraph 22 that the choice not to seek advice was deliberate and held that the appellants had to bear the consequences of that conscious decision. At stage three, conducting the balancing exercise, the Tribunal weighed the importance of compliance with statutory time-limits against the appellants' position; the Tribunal noted at paragraph 47 that shortage of funds (which had been raised as a reason the appellants did not engage an adviser) is not a weighty reason in the Martland framework. Permission to bring the late appeal was refused.

Why 'I did not take professional advice' is not a good reason for delay

The case-law line on no-professional-advice reasoning is consistent. Three points emerge:

1. The appeal-lodging obligation is personal. The taxpayer is the person whose return is in dispute and who bears the liability for any underpaid SDLT. The statutory time-limit at FA 2003 Schedule 10 paragraph 35 is addressed to the taxpayer. The decision whether or not to instruct an adviser is the taxpayer's own. Not engaging an adviser does not pause the time-limit; the time-limit operates against the taxpayer regardless.
2. A choice not to seek advice is a positive decision, not an external obstacle. The Martland framework distinguishes between reasons that are obstacles (illness, bereavement, physical impossibility of action) and reasons that are choices (decision not to engage an adviser, decision to focus on other matters, decision based on the taxpayer's own assessment of the merits). The Goonesena Tribunal expressly characterised the appellants' position as a conscious choice they had to bear the consequences of. The line of authority (BPP Holdings UKSC, Martland UKUT, Katib UKUT, Hicks FTT) consistently treats choices as weaker reasons than obstacles.
3. The underlying position was within the taxpayer's reasonable means to investigate. SDLT is a relatively well-documented tax; HMRC publishes extensive manuals (the SDLT Manual at SDLTM00000+) and gov.uk publishes the rate tables and key reliefs in plain English. A taxpayer who chose not to investigate at the time of the original return, then re-evaluated months or years later, has not been prevented from compliance with the time-limit; they have made a choice not to engage with the system at the relevant time.

The Goonesena Tribunal noted that shortage of funds (raised as the practical reason the appellants did not engage an adviser at the time) is not a weighty reason in the Martland framework. Adviser fees are a real-world cost, but the statutory time-limit does not differentiate between taxpayers who can and cannot afford advice; the obligation to lodge an appeal in time applies equally.

The overpayment-relief alternative under FA 2003 Schedule 10 paragraph 34

Where the 30-day appeal window has passed and a Martland-late-appeal application is not viable, the alternative route is overpayment relief under FA 2003 Schedule 10 paragraph 34. The overpayment relief regime is the SDLT equivalent of TMA 1970 Schedule 1AB for income tax and capital gains tax. Key features:

• Time-limit: four years from the chargeable transaction date (the effective date of the transaction under FA 2003 s.119).
• Procedural gateway: the taxpayer makes a claim to HMRC identifying a specific overpayment of SDLT and providing evidence supporting the claim. The claim is not lodged with the Tribunal; it is made to HMRC in the first instance.
• HMRC response: HMRC may agree the claim and pay out, or refuse it (or pay out in part).
• Appeal route on refusal: refusal of overpayment relief generates a fresh 30-day appeal window under Schedule 10 paragraph 35, this time against the refusal. The substantive appeal then proceeds in the usual way.
• Substantive grounds: narrower than the appeal route. Paragraph 34 limits the grounds on which an overpayment can be claimed and excludes cases where the overpayment results from the taxpayer's choice of treatment, certain mistakes of law, and similar exclusions.

The overpayment-relief route is the practical option for many taxpayers approached by SDLT-refund-claim firms many months or years after completion. It is not a wholesale alternative to the appeal route; the substantive grounds are narrower and the evidential burden differs. A taxpayer considering an overpayment-relief claim should take independent professional advice on the merits before paying any contingent fee to a refund-claim firm.

Cost of an unsuccessful late-appeal application

An unsuccessful late-appeal application carries direct and indirect costs. The original SDLT assessment stands. Interest under FA 2003 s.87 continues accruing from the original tax-due date through the delay period; the Goonesena 164-day delay would represent five to six months of additional interest on the original SDLT figure. Possible FA 2007 Schedule 24 penalty exposure remains in play if HMRC contends the original SDLT return was careless or deliberate. Procedural costs of the late-appeal application itself include the taxpayer's adviser fees (if any), the Tribunal lodgment fee (none in the FTT for first-instance appeals), and any costs order in a Complex-procedure case (rare for the late-appeal application itself; Default-procedure cases are costs-neutral).

The economic position of an unsuccessful late-appeal applicant is therefore worse than the position at the closure-notice date by the accrued interest, any penalty exposure, and the procedural costs incurred. The cost of getting the procedural decision right at the closure-notice or assessment date is materially lower than the cost of attempting to recover the position later.

Penalty determinations and the same 30-day window

FA 2007 Schedule 24 penalty determinations carry their own 30-day statutory appeal window. The Martland framework applies identically to penalty late-appeal applications. The no-professional-advice reasoning is similarly weak for penalty late-appeals, on the same logic that applied in Goonesena: the appeal-lodging obligation is personal to the taxpayer, the statutory time-limit is strict, and the working benchmark for serious or significant delay is more than three months.

The substantive grounds for challenging an SDLT penalty (reasonable excuse, careless versus deliberate behaviour classification, special reduction under FA 2007 Schedule 24 paragraph 11) sit on the substantive side of the analysis; the appeal-window jurisdiction sits on the procedural side. Both must be satisfied for a penalty appeal to proceed. A taxpayer with a strong substantive case on penalty but a missed appeal window faces the same Martland-framework gateway as the Goonesena appellants.

Implications for SDLT-refund-claim firms and the taxpayers they approach

SDLT-refund-claim firms typically approach taxpayers some time after completion of the original transaction, suggesting that the original SDLT figure was overpaid and offering to pursue a refund on a contingent-fee basis. The economic incentives are asymmetric: the firm earns a contingent fee on a successful claim; the taxpayer bears the original SDLT liability, accrued interest, potential penalty exposure, and the firm's fees if the claim fails. Where the approach comes months or years after completion, the practical route is overpayment relief under Schedule 10 paragraph 34, not a late appeal.

Goonesena underscores the narrow nature of the late-appeal jurisdiction. The decision is on point for taxpayers considering whether to engage with refund-claim firm pitches that suggest a late appeal is routine: it is not. The Martland framework, the 30-day statutory window, and the no-professional-advice line of authority together establish a high bar. Taxpayers should:

1. Check whether the 30-day Schedule 10 paragraph 35 appeal window is still open. If not, evaluate the Martland route only with a substantive obstacle-based reason for delay (not a no-advice or merits-re-evaluation reason).
2. Check whether the four-year Schedule 10 paragraph 34 overpayment-relief window is still open. Most refund-claim-firm-driven scenarios sit here, not on the appeal route.
3. Take independent advice from a chartered tax adviser or solicitor with SDLT specialism before paying any contingent fee.
4. Read our SDLT refund scams page for the wider pattern of speculative claim marketing.

What to do when an HMRC SDLT decision lands and the 30 days has not yet expired

Act quickly. The 30-day window is strict. Concrete steps:

• Acknowledge receipt of the decision (closure notice, assessment, or determination) and date-stamp the file on the day it lands.
• Understand the decision: identify the SDLT figure at issue, the periods or transactions affected, and HMRC's reasoning.
• Take independent professional advice within the first week of the 30 days, so there is time to evaluate options.
• Decide whether to settle, accept, or appeal. If accepting, pay the tax + interest to stop the interest clock.
• If appealing, lodge the notice of appeal with HMRC within the 30 days. Consider whether to request a review under FA 2003 Schedule 10A (which can defer the tribunal-lodgment moment to the post-review outcome).
• If the appeal proceeds to the FTT, lodge the notice with the Tribunal within the relevant window after HMRC's final position.

Do not let the 30 days run out while still considering options. Once the window closes, the late-appeal route is narrow (Goonesena confirms this), the economic position deteriorates with each month of delay (accrued interest), and the procedural cost of recovery rises.

Statutory references

• FA 2003 Schedule 10 (Returns, Enquiries, Assessments and Appeals), particularly paragraphs 25, 28, 29, 34, 35: legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/14/schedule/10 (verified 2026-05-26).
• FA 2003 Schedule 10A (Review by HMRC and appeal procedure).
• FA 2003 s.87 (Interest on unpaid tax): runs from the date the tax was due.
• FA 2003 s.119 (Effective date of transaction): the date from which the four-year overpayment relief window under Sch 10 para 34 runs.
• Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (SI 2009/273): legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/273. Rule 5(3)(a) (general case-management power to extend time); rule 20(4) (late appeal-notice procedure).
• Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC): controlling Upper Tribunal authority on late-appeal applications; three-stage framework.
• BPP Holdings v HMRC [2017] UKSC 55: Supreme Court affirmation of importance of statutory time-limit compliance in the tax-tribunal context.
• HMRC v Katib [2019] UKUT 189 (TCC): agent failures versus taxpayer personal responsibility.
• Denton v TH White [2014] EWCA Civ 906: the civil-procedure approach imported into the tax-tribunal late-appeal framework via Martland.
• R & E Goonesena v HMRC [2024] UKFTT 619 (TC) (TC09240, 25 June 2024, Tribunal Judge Abigail McGregor): caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/tc/2024/619
• HMRC Compliance Handbook ARTG2000+ (Appeals, Reviews and Tribunals Guidance): gov.uk ARTG2000
• FA 2007 Schedule 24 (penalty regime for inaccuracies in documents).